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Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-1 (1953) ---------------------------------- 1 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES CUMMINGS, ( 
Defendant-Appellant. ' 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12487 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the defendant-appellant, James 
Cummings, from a conviction for robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was convicted pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-51-1 (1953) at a jury trial in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District, the Honorable Gordon R. 
Hall, presiding. The appellant was sentenced to an in-
determinate term in the Utah State Prison as provided 
by law for the crime of robbery. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
district court should be affirmed and that the appellant 
should be retained in custody at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth in the appellant's 
brief is accurate and a further statement will not be made 
by the respondent except as necessary in presenting its 
argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A CLAIMED VIOLATION OF DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW IN THE CONDUCT OF A 
LINEUP DEPENDS UPON THE TOTALITY 
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUND-
ING THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION. 
WHERE THE EYEWITNESS HAD AN IN-
DEPENDENT BASIS FOR MAKING THE 
IDENTIFICATION, THE DEFENDANT-AP-
PELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW EVEN THOUGH HE WAS 
THE ONLY SUSPECT IN THE LINEUP 
WITH SCARS ON HIS ARMS. 
The appellant contends that the lineup at which he 
was identified was basically unfair and implanted in the 
mind of the state's witness that the defendant was the 
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same person as the suspect who robbed the Bonus Station 
at Ninth South and West Temple in Salt Lake City. To 
support his contention that the lineup procedures were 
inherently suggestive, the appellant cites the testimony 
of his attorney, Jay Edmonds, relating to the composition 
of the lineup. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Ed-
monds was permitted to examine the lineup before the 
witnesses were admitted to the show-up room. He was 
given the opportunity to raise objections as to the com-
position or any part of the lineup, but he declined to do 
so (T. 20-21). 
From the testimony of the identifying witness, Bryce 
Nelson, it is clear that Nelson's identification of the de-
fendant was confident and unequivocal and did not de-
pend upon the allegedly suggestive identification pro-
cedure. At page 7 of his brief, the appellant takes certain 
liberties with his interpretation of the transcript and 
would mislead the court by extracting language from the 
transcript and labeling it as Nelson's inability to recog-
nize the defendant as the suspect. In actuality, the ques-
tion to which the witness responded had reference to the 
individual who had occupied space number one in the 
lineup and not the defendant who had occupied space 
number three. vVhen asked if he recognized [Number 
One], Nelson responded, "I can't remember" (T. 10). 
Nelson testified that the identification was made on the 
basis of the general appearance of the suspect (T. 7) 
which was a product of the witness' observation of the 
suspect at the time of the robbery. 
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The standard for determining the illegality of an 
identification elicited during a pretrial confrontation is 
set forth in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967), 
and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967). In these 
cases the United States Supreme Court observed that a 
pretrial confrontation will constitute a ground for reversal 
of the conviction where, depending upon the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the confrontation, it " ... 
was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepar-
able mistaken identification that defendant was denied 
due process of law." Stovall, supra, at 302. 
The language in both Wade and Stovall indicates 
that, in considering the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding any pretrial identification, the presence of cer-
tain other facts in the totality may serve either to justify 
an improperly conducted identification or to avoid the 
presumption that the defendant has been prejudiced by 
the allegedly suggestive confrontation. For example, where 
factors external to the confrontation itself tend to prove 
that the witness's identification was accurate and hence 
not prejudicial to the defendant, courts have upheld the 
use of identification procedures which arguably could be 
regarded as suggestive. See, e.g., United States ex rel. 
Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F. 2d 217 (2d Cir. 1969); Cline 
v. United States, 395 F. 2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968); Hanks 
v. United States, 388 F. 2d 171 (10th Cir. 1968). 
In the Rutherford case, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals evaluated the accuracy of an identification re-
sulting from an allegedly suggestive pretrial confronta-
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tion. The witness whose cleaning establishment had been 
robbed was called to the police station to examine a sus-
pect. At the station house the witness viewed the defen-
dant, a Negro, in a room with several white detectives by 
means of a one-way minor, and immediately identified 
him as the criminal. Holding that the identification of the 
defendant was probably accurate, regardless of the preju-
dicial nature of the confrontation, Judge Medina placed 
great emphasis on the fact that the witness had for some 
five minutes watched the two men who had committed 
the robbery, making a deliberate attempt to study the 
face of the man who rifled her pocketbook. 
This approach to the totality test adopted by the 
Second Circuit has support in two Supreme Court deci-
sions since Stouall. In Simnwns v. United States, 390 
U. S. 377 (1968), the Court validated a photographic 
showup relying, at least in part, upon its belief that there 
was little chance that a misidentification had taken place 
because the witness had an excellent opportunity to ob-
serve the suspects during the robbery. In Biggers v. Ten-
nessee, 390 U. S'. 404 (1968), the Court, splitting four-to-
four, affirmed per curiam a conviction resting upon a 
showup identification. Significantly, Justice Douglas in 
his dissent considered factors similar to those weighed by 
the courts in both Rutherford and Simnwns, although he 
reasoned that, on the facts of the case, the accuracy of 
the identification was in doubt and, therefore, the con-
frontation violated due process. 
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In Thurman v. State, 262 N. E. 2d 635 (Ind. 1970), 
the Indiana Supreme Court observed that the resolution 
cf \1·hether identification procedures are unduly suggestive 
or conducive to irreparable mistaken identity is best ac-
complished by a hearing in the trial court, for it is there 
that an exploration of the circumstances surrounding the 
confrontation can be accomplished. On this basis, the 
court upheld the identification and conviction of a Negro 
defendant who had been the only individual in an all 
Negro lineup with an "Afro" haircut where it was shown 
that the witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the 
defendant during the commission of the crime. Paren-
thetically it should be noted that each of the witnesses 
had earlier told police investigators that the suspect wore 
his hair in the "Afro" style. 
The facts of the insb::it case demonstrate that a care-
ful examination of the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the identification yields the conclusion that Mr. 
N dson identified the defendant without depending upon 
the allegedly wggestive circumstances surrounding the 
identification procedure. This is not a case where the 
witness's identification of the suspect is based upon a fleet-
ing glance of the suspect as in People v. Caruso, 68 Cal. 
2d 183, 436 P. 2d 336 (1968). On the contrary, Nelson 
was the victim of the crime. He was held at gunpoint by 
the suspect in an area of excellent lighting, and as the 
witnesses in Rutherford, Simmons, Biggers, and Thurman, 
Nelson had an ample opportunity to observe the defen-
d."nt during the commission of the crime. 
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The respondent does not seriously contest the appel-
lant's contention that situations may arise in which a 
suspect is the only individual in a police lineup with dis-
tinguishing features or characteristics. Nor does the re-
spondent argue that such features or characteristics may 
have some suggestive impact upon the witnesses who are 
present for purposes of identification. For example, in 
State v. Ervin, 22 Utah 2d 216, 451 P. 2d 372 (1969), this 
Court decried the manipulation of police lineups so as to 
be unduly suggestive of identification. However, implicit 
in this statement is the Utah Supreme Court's recognition 
that the element of suggestability cannot be removed 
co:npletely from lineup procedures. Indeed, the Court 
observed that the lineup procedure should not be "so 
laden with difficulties nor burdened with super-cautions 
as to make lineups impractical as a method of identifying 
the guilty." 22 Utah 2d at 221. 
Where the eyewitness has an independent basis for 
the in-court identification of the defendant, the United 
States Supreme Court has enunciated the rule that such 
identification is admissible even though the pre-trial 
identification was violative of due process. Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). With this in mind, 
the Court vacated the conviction of the petitioner in 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 272-273 (1967) to 
permit the California Supreme Court to determine 
whether an independent basis would support the identifi-
cation. See also, Clemons v. United States, 408 F. 2d 
1230, 1237 (D. C. Cir. 1968). 
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Two recent decisions by the Utah Supreme Court 
further support the respondent's position that even grant-
ing that the lineup procedures suggested which individual 
the witness would identify, the identification is not tainted 
where there exists an independent basis for the in-court 
identification. In State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 
P. 2d 786 (1969), the in-court identification of the defen-
dant was permitted where the witness had an indepen-
dent basis for making the identification even though the 
defendant had been denied counsel at the lineup. Simi-
larly, this Court rejected the appellant's argument in 
State v. Jordan, 26 Utah 2d 240, 487 P. 2d 1281 (1971), 
holding that any irregularities in the positive identifica-
tion of the defendant by eyewitnesses could not have 
resulted in any substantial prejudice to the defendant and 
did not deny him due process where the eyewitnesses had 
other bases for making the identification. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that the lineup 
was representative and conducted in a manner which 
would not unduly suggest the identity of the suspect. 
The respondent further submits that even granting that 
the identification procedure was suggestive, the resulting 
identification was not tainted since the identifying wit-
ness had an independent basis upon which to form his 
in-court identification and that such identification was a 
genuine product of the knowledge and recollection of the 
witness. 
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The respondent therefore prays this Honorable Court 
to affirm the conviction of the defendant for the crime of 
robbery. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
